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Norms, Power and the Socially Embedded Realities of Market Taxation in 
Northern Ghana 
 
 
Wilson Prichard and Vanessa van den Boogaard 
 
 
Summary 
 
The advance of decentralisation efforts in Africa has brought with it expanded discussion of local 
government taxation, and the potential for tax reform to spur broader state building and 
governance gains. However, while this literature has acknowledged the importance of local 
politics and context, it has remained largely grounded in a formal understanding of local tax 
systems, rather than an understanding of the often informal day-to-day realities of sub-national 
taxation. This paper correspondingly provides a ground level view of market and small business 
taxation in two local government areas in Ghana’s disadvantaged northern region. Doing so 
reveals a system shaped by ingrained informal practices that are grounded in existing social 
relationships and collective norms. These informal practices sometimes foster greater equity and 
responsiveness than formal rules, but in other cases serve to reinforce existing inequalities. We 
conclude by arguing that existing approaches to reform are likely to be undermined by a failure 
to appreciate the socially embedded realities of local government taxation, and we propose 
possible reform strategies that ‘work with the grain’ of existing practices. 
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Introduction 
 
It is now widely accepted that while decentralisation has the potential to improve government 
effectiveness and strengthen democratic processes in low-income countries, these goals have 
frequently not been achieved (Bahl and Bird 2008, Devarajan, Khemani and Shah 2009). The 
construction of effective sub-national tax and revenue systems has offered a particularly vivid 
illustration of these challenges: fiscal decentralisation has been recognised as critical to the 
broader efficiency and governance gains promised by decentralisation, but is a realm in which 
reform has been particularly ineffective or, at the very least, incompletely administered (Jibao 
and Prichard 2013; Bird 2011). Explanations for these failures have increasingly focused on 
political barriers to reform, and on the importance of context-specific responses, thus moving 
beyond the largely technocratic approaches of the past (Smoke 2013; Jibao and Prichard 2013; 
Bahl and Bird 2008). However, most accounts have continued to begin implicitly with an image 
of an ‘ideal’, rational-legal system of local government taxation, whereas the reality of sub-
national taxation – particularly outside of major metropolitan centres – is often much ‘messier’ 
and characterised by pervasive informality, grounded in existing social relationships and 
collective norms. Existing reform prescriptions for local government taxation seek in many ways 
to simply wish these challenges away, calling for improved monitoring, greater capacity and 
reduced discretion. By contrast, we suggest that more effective reform can likely be achieved by 
‘working with the grain’ of local governance realities (Booth 2011a; Kelsall 2011), by seeking to 
design reform in a way that is consonant with inescapable capacity constraints and the broader 
social reality in which collection efforts are embedded. 
 
Acknowledging this disconnect, we provide a ground-level view of the day-to-day realities of 
local government taxation in the context of a decentralisation agenda that has been prioritised 
by both international donors and the central government. We do so through a focused study of 
market taxation in two districts in Ghana’s disadvantaged northern regions, Lawra and Yendi.1 
We focus on market taxation because it offers a lens into face-to-face interactions between 
relatively marginalised citizens – poor market traders, most of whom are women – and the local 
state. Aside from their relative fiscal significance to local assemblies, market taxes are important 
as they are often the principal manner through which traders interact with local government 
representatives (Owusu and Lund 2004). More basically, as a direct tax, market taxes are highly 
‘visible’ to citizens, making them potentially more likely than indirect taxes to spur citizen 
engagement with tax bargaining and governance processes (Prichard 2010; Joshi, Prichard and 
Heady 2012; Bird and Zolt 2005). Moreover, through our focus on a relatively marginalised 
region of the country, we capture the reality of local tax institutions outside of major urban 
centres in two economically and politically distinct locations. Our goal is to reveal the informal 
norms and institutions governing the tax system as it functions in practice, and to explore the 
potential implications for local livelihoods and governance, and for thinking about local 
government tax reform. 
 
In adopting this focus we draw on a rapidly growing literature focusing on the informal 
institutions and practices that often underpin local economies and governance systems. These 
                                                        
1  Ghana’s northern regions have been relatively marginalised since before the colonial period, when Ashanti and Fante armies 
raided the northern areas for slaves for the transatlantic slave trade and later for the development of cocoa plantations in 
southern Ghana. This marginalisation continued during the colonial era, when educational and economic opportunities 
centred in the south, and persisted after independence. Within the last two decades, the gap between levels of development 
and per capita incomes in the north and the south has widened considerably, with recent economic development 
concentrated almost exclusively in the south (World Bank 2004).  
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approaches seek to understand how these institutions interact with formal regulatory systems 
and practices, and how formal and informal processes can work together as ‘hybrid’ institutions, 
forming ‘second best’ approaches to governance (Meagher and Lindell 2013; Kelsall 2011; 
Centre for the Future State (CFS) 2010; Joshi and Ayee 2008; Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006; 
Cleaver 2001; Titeca and Flynn 2014). However, while this growing body of literature has 
advanced thinking about ‘real’ governance in low-income countries, studies to date have 
generally focused on informality within cross-border trade or urban centres. By contrast, there 
are, to our knowledge, no in-depth studies of the day-to-day experiences of taxpayers in smaller 
towns – despite the fact these areas are home to a large share of citizens in low-income 
countries. We thus seek to shed light on an area that has been particularly overlooked by 
researchers, national policymakers and central tax administrations. 
 
In order to do so, we draw on two months of intensive field research carried out in Lawra and 
Yendi in 2011 and 2012, as well as broader research about the Ghanaian tax systems spanning 
almost a decade. The field research included interviews and focus group discussions with 
market traders, representatives of various market associations and ‘commodity groups’, and in-
depth interviews with representatives from the respective local governments and central 
government ministries. This included semi-structured interviews with fifty traders in each location 
based on purposive selection from multiple ‘commodity lines’, as well as over fifty in-depth 
interviews with market representatives and government officials.2   
 
We find that local tax systems are defined by a stark lack of administrative capacity, and the 
corresponding prevalence of informal practices. However, despite the absence of strong formal 
rules these informal practices are relatively predictable, accepted and ingrained, with day-to-day 
outcomes heavily shaped by existing communal and social relationships and collective norms. In 
many cases these ingrained informal practices improve equity and state-society relations, by, for 
example, smoothing tax demands in the face of seasonality and building trust between 
taxpayers and tax collectors. However, in other cases, they serve to reinforce existing social 
hierarchies and power relations, as with the exploitation of itinerant and foreign traders, or 
special privileges granted to well-connected individuals. Ultimately, we conclude that improved 
reform outcomes can be achieved by ‘working with the grain’ of these inescapable local realities, 
while seeking to minimise the potential costs of informality. In particular we stress the potential 
benefits of strengthening local market associations, engaging traditional authorities and 
empowering local tax authorities. 
 
The paper proceeds in five parts. Section 1 reviews existing research that considers the day-to-
day realities and informal institutions shaping local economic and governance structures in sub-
Saharan Africa. Section 2 provides a brief background to the local government and tax system in 
Ghana. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the functioning of the local government tax 
systems in Yendi and Lawra, as seen by small business taxpayers and tax officials. The 
emphasis is on capturing not only the formal structure of the system, but the more informal 
realities of administration and of citizen engagement with the system. Section 4 explores 
potential strategies for pursuing reform in a way that better fits local institutional and social 
realities. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                        
2  See Appendix for a detailed list of interviews. ‘Commodity lines’ refer to the common organisational market structure wherein 
separate commodities or sets of commodities are concentrated in distinct retail areas (Clark 2010b).   
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1 Literature review 
 
Since the 1980s, decentralisation has been a central component of orthodox development policy 
agendas throughout sub-Saharan Africa. This policy push, largely driven by external actors, is 
based on the idea that by bringing the delivery of government services closer to the people, and 
by deepening democratic channels, decentralisation provides the key to better governance at 
sub-national levels. Despite widespread international support for decentralisation initiatives, 
however, recent evidence suggests that the assumed benefits of decentralisation are highly 
variable, with local revenue mobilisation, public service delivery and government accountability 
remaining weak within most decentralised governments in sub-Saharan Africa (Burki, Perry and 
Dillinger 1999; Booth 2011b; Bahl 1999; Grindle 2002; Jibao and Prichard 2013).  
 
Poor governance outcomes in practice reflect, at least in part, the disconnect that exists 
between official policies and the often informal local institutional realities that shape outcomes in 
practice (Smoke and Lewis 1996). International policymakers have tended to frame 
decentralisation reforms through a paradigmatic Weberian lens that reflects recent Western 
institutional history, while focusing on narrow bureaucratic adjustments to formal institutions. As 
Booth (2011a: 2) explains, the orthodox good governance and institution building agenda ‘fails to 
reflect the more genuinely universal experience that institutions work better when they build on 
what exists, make use of indigenous institutional creativity or are otherwise rooted in their 
sociocultural context’. This approach risks overlooking the many ways in which local political and 
social dynamics shape governance outcomes (Smoke 2013; Crook and Sverrisson 2003; Crook 
and Manor 1998; Crook 2003; Devarajan, Khemani and Shah 2009; Booth 2011a). Rather than 
simply a technical or managerial exercise, historical and social institutions shape 
decentralisation processes, defining practical, ‘working’ norms (Olivier de Sardan 2008). 
 
Instead of being ‘sidelined or viewed merely as barriers to changes whose desirability has been 
defined a priori’ (Booth 2011a: 2), a more realistic assessment of the informal realities of 
subnational tax systems can shed light on how institutional resources and historical legacies 
might be positively harnessed to support local development – effectively, how policies can be 
designed to work ‘with the grain’ of existing social and governance structures (Booth 2011a; see 
also Kelsall 2011). Increasingly, informal economic and governance systems are seen less as 
‘backward’ or ‘dysfunctional’, and more as ‘arrangements that work’ (Kelsall 2011). They are 
viewed as mechanisms that can be harnessed towards improving public service delivery, tax 
collection and governance through collaborative interaction between formal and informal 
institutions, described variously as ‘hybrid governance’, ‘coproduction’, and ‘formal-informal 
linkages’ (CFS 2010; Joshi and Moore 2004; Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006; Meagher and Lindell 
2013). 
 
The importance of exploring ‘real’ governance at the local government level is thus increasingly 
accepted, though the implications of these systems for livelihoods and reform are invariably 
complex (Olivier de Sardan 2008). Recent research has captured the ways in which informal 
norms and institutions continually interact with official rules to generate the dynamic ‘practical’ 
norms that define the system of taxation experienced by taxpayers (Cantens 2012; Olivier de 
Sardan 2008; Blundo 2006; Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012). In certain 
instances, these practical norms can address concerns that are ignored by state regulations, 
forming the basis of an underlying ‘moral economy’ motivated by popular norms of fairness and 
reciprocity (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976).  
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However, alongside the potential benefits of informality lies the reality that informal governance 
practices are likely to reflect existing social hierarchies and power relations, and ‘may demonise 
or exclude certain categories of people’ (Cleaver et al. 2013; Meagher and Lindell 2013). Norm 
creation is a dynamic and continually negotiated process, dependent on the ‘specific 
configuration of power that sustains the modus vivendi of different social actors in a specific 
domain’ (Titeca and de Herdt 2010: 579; see also Olivier de Sardan 2008; Blundo 2006). Hybrid 
or plural governance arrangements may thus not create more inclusive economic or governance 
institutions in practice, but may instead simply increase opportunities for some while multiplying 
disadvantages for others (Cleaver et al. 2013). 
 
These tensions are made plain by a small body of research that has begun to look at the 
informal realities governing taxation, primarily in post-conflict settings. Titeca and de Herdt 
(2010), for example, have argued that while non-statutory negotiation of tax rates may deprive 
the state of resources, it can equally respond to the realities of economic underdevelopment and 
political marginalisation. More broadly, in contexts where the state is weak and/or taxpayers are 
well-organised, informal practices can result in better treatment for taxpayers, including some 
circumstances wherein populations essentially dictate what taxes are extracted (Titeca and de 
Herdt 2010; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012).  
 
However, in the majority of cases explored by recent research, the scope for coercion by 
government officials is substantial, while barriers to collective action by taxpayers are high, 
making small-scale and marginalised economic actors particularly unlikely to have power to 
influence the practical norms shaping the de facto rules of the game (Schomerus and Titeca 
2012; Titeca 2011; Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012).3 In some cases 
unofficial tax exemptions have been used as a means of political or social inclusion or exclusion, 
for example by discriminating against ‘out-groups’ such as foreigners or migrants (e.g. Flynn 
1997; Juul 2006; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012; Meagher 2013). 
More broadly, it is frequently the weakest actors who are vulnerable to extortion, while more 
powerful actors are able to collude with tax collectors to avoid taxes.  
 
The bottom line from existing research is not that informal or hybrid governance is inherently 
positive or negative for those affected, as observed impacts are diverse and context specific. 
Instead, the message is more nuanced: tax outcomes in practice are substantially shaped by 
informal norms and practices, and any effort to understand local government taxation, or to 
consider the potential for reform, should begin from an understanding of these realities (Blundo 
2006; Olivier de Sardan 2008). Critically, while these patterns of informal tax governance shape 
tax incidence and livelihoods, they may also shape the ability of taxpayers to engage with the 
state, and their perceptions of the state and its legitimacy. For this reason, understanding the 
informal realities shaping local government taxation may also be critical to understanding 
decentralised governance more broadly (Joshi et al. forthcoming). With these broad lessons, we 
aim to contribute to the literature by providing an in-depth case study of taxation in market trade 
in marginalised areas outside of metropolitan centres, while at the same time broadening the 
discussion of the implications of informality in terms of intellectual and policy approaches to local 
government taxation and decentralisation. 
 
 
                                                        
3  With regard to the informal practice of tax rate negotiation, several studies have demonstrated that information and power 
imbalances in the negotiation of informal tax rates can actually make the burdens of informal taxes be higher than their formal 
equivalents, with a disproportionately negative impact on small-scale traders (World Bank 2011). 
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2 Background: local revenue collection in 
Ghana 
 
On the surface, Ghana has implemented an ambitious decentralisation programme. Under the 
decentralisation programme initiated in 1998, the country is divided into six metropolitan 
assemblies, 56 municipal assemblies and 154 district assemblies, each of which is, in turn, 
comprised of town, area, urban and/or zonal councils.4 In principle these assemblies exercise 
significant political and fiscal autonomy, with each assembly responsible for setting rates of 
taxation for local government taxes within its jurisdiction, with the bulk of internally generated 
revenue coming from fees for trading in the market or exporting foodstuffs outside of the district, 
business licenses and the basic rate, a poll tax. The assembly is responsible for gazetting, 
publishing and making publicly available these tax rates, which are reviewed annually and 
codified within a fee fixing resolution. Salaried tax collectors, employees of the local government 
whose salaries are paid by the central government, and commission-based collectors, who 
typically receive 10 to 20 per cent commission on market tickets, collect local taxes. Additionally, 
districts may periodically, often on an annual basis, organise a ‘district task force’ to collect taxes 
on one or more specified days. These task forces, made up of assembly employees and/or 
students and volunteers, are intended to mobilise revenue, especially within markets, in order to 
assess revenue potential, as well as, more often than not, to meet imminent revenue targets. 
 
Despite seemingly strong legislative foundations – and symptomatic of the limitations of the 
broader decentralisation agenda – local revenue mobilisation in Ghana is extremely weak, with 
local governments heavily dependent on donors and fiscal transfers from the central government 
(Figure 1). Poor local revenue collection reflects poor performance and limited capacity, but also 
limited revenue sources allocated to local governments, with local governments retaining 
authority over an incoherent and complex set of revenue instruments that offer low collection 
potential and high collection costs. In this context, market revenues, in the form of fees and stall 
rents, are of considerable importance for local governments – as they have been historically 
(Clark 2010a) – representing an average of 27 per cent and 24 per cent of local government tax 
revenue from 2001 to 2011 in Lawra and Yendi, respectively. Finally, the central government 
retains an important direct presence in individual districts: the national tax authority – the Ghana 
Revenue Agency (GRA) – maintains regional and/or district offices responsible for collecting 
centrally controlled income and value-added taxes, while districts are overseen by a 
presidentially-appointed District Chief Executive, and up to 30 per cent of assembly members in 
each district are also appointed by the President (GoG 1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4  Metropolitan assemblies are those representing populations above 250,000; municipal assemblies represent populations of 
between 95,000 and 250,000; while district assemblies represent populations above 75,000. As local government 
nomenclature is simply based on population size, we use the terms ‘districts’ as a generic term to refer to all assemblies. 
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Figure 2 Grants and transfers as shares of total assembly revenue, 2011 
 
 
 
Note: ‘The northern regions’ refers to the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. 
 
3 Local government taxation in practice 
 
In order to capture the day-to-day realities of tax practice we focus on the districts of Yendi and 
Lawra in Ghana’s marginalised northern regions. Both districts have primarily agricultural 
economies, with poverty rates far above national averages, while revenue collection on a per 
capita basis is comparable across the two locations, though below national averages for similarly 
sized districts (Figure 2). They thus offer insight into realities in comparatively marginalised 
regions, and among relatively marginalised groups.    
 
Figure 2: Average per capita internally generated funds, 2009-2011 
 
 
 
Note: ‘Internally generated funds’ include both tax revenue and other locally generated revenue, including that from investments. 
Data is based on the local government structure as it existed in 2011 and thus includes 124 districts, 40 municipalities and six 
metropolises. Per capita data is based on 2010 populations. USD equivalents are calculated using the international market exchange 
rate for 1 August 2012.   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. 
 
Though the goal is not to systematically compare the two districts, they also differ in important 
ways that allow for selective comparison and additional insights (see Table 1). Most obviously, 
Yendi is twice as large and more economically active, hosting larger daily and periodic markets, 
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with more extensive permanent market infrastructure. More subtly, Yendi has been home to 
more adversarial politics in recent years, grounded in chieftaincy and ethnic conflict (Jönsson 
2009). This has, in turn, been reflected in tax practices, with civil society leaders reporting 
relatively poor relations between taxpayers and the government in Yendi, as well as adversarial 
engagement by the chieftaincy with tax issues.5 By contrast, Lawra has been reported to exhibit 
much more positive attitudes toward tax compliance, and more positive engagement by the 
chieftaincy (Carroll 2011). We expect the latter to be associated with a greater degree of ‘quasi-
voluntary’ or ‘grudging’ compliance – that is, a greater degree of taxpayer cooperation with tax 
authorities (Levi 1988; Moore 2013; Tilly 2005). 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of key features of Yendi and Lawra 
 Yendi Municipality Lawra District 
Region Northern  Upper West 
Population (2010) 199,592 100,9296 
Area 5,350 square kilometres 1,051 square kilometres 
Average annual tax 
revenue, 2001-2011 (USD) 
 
$37,402.50 
 
$18,686 
 
Average annual per capita 
tax revenue, 2001-2011 
(USD) 
 
$0.19 
 
$0.19 
Permanent revenue 
collectors 
4 0 
Commission-based 
revenue collectors 
13 21 
Daily market fees (USD) $0.05  $0.05 to $0.15 
Monthly market rents (USD) $0.51 to $7.68 
 
$0.26 to $0.51 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from local assemblies. 
 
Market interviewees in our case studies reflect a mix of small traders that operate exclusively 
within district markets, and traders that have additional operations outside of the market space 
itself in small business spaces or kiosks. Of the respondents, 98 per cent reported paying local 
taxes, though with variation between market fees, market rents and other taxes. Approximately 
46 per cent reported paying exclusively daily market fees, 20 per cent paying monthly market 
rents for occupying formal market stalls, 31 per cent paying both market fees and market rents, 
and 3 per cent paying another type of local tax. Additionally, 58 per cent of interviewees 
regularly made some form of payment to a local traditional authority, while 9 per cent, all of 
whom operated small businesses in addition to their market trade, reported paying national 
income taxes in the form of ‘tax stamps’.7 
                                                        
5  Personal interviews with senior staff members from Christian Aid Ghana, the Ghana Integrity Initiative and the Ghana 
Association of Women Entrepreneurs, November 2011, Accra, Ghana. These organisations have all been involved with 
previous studies of tax practices in Lawra and Yendi, and these perceived differences between the two locations helped to 
inform our case selection. 
6  In 2012, as part of a nationwide local government administrative reorganisation that created 46 new districts, Lawra District 
was split into two administrative districts: Lawra and Nandom. Accordingly, the 2010 population data reported is larger than 
the cut-off for district assemblies, though Lawra was still considered a district rather than a municipality.  
7  At the national level firms in the informal sector are subject to a presumptive system of income taxation by which firms pay a 
quarterly flat rate tax based on their area of business and size, and in return receive a tax stamp for display at their place of 
business. 
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Against this background, our analysis proceeds in three parts. First, we highlight key features of 
the economic and institutional context for local government market and small business taxation, 
highlighting a series of relatively inescapable constraints shaping tax collection. These resource 
and capacity constraints, in turn, serve to make informal practices an unavoidable, and pivotal, 
feature of tax collection in practice. The second part of the analysis correspondingly focuses on 
capturing these informal practices, highlighting the ways in which local economic realities, social 
norms of fairness and reciprocity, and social hierarchies and power dynamics influence 
outcomes. Finally, we consider the nature of relations between market traders, market 
associations and the state, highlighting continued barriers to strengthening the effective voice of 
marginalised taxpayers. 
 
3.1 Capacity, resource and institutional constraints  
 
Understanding the day-to-day realities of market and small business taxation requires first an 
appreciation of the stark capacity, resource and institutional constraints confronting tax collection 
efforts. As in low-income countries more generally, the tax system is hampered by human and 
resource capacity constraints, with revenue collectors and supervisors demonstrating limited 
procedural, technical or rights-based understanding of the local tax system. Rapid fiscal 
decentralisation has likewise created challenges in the establishment of functional bureaucratic 
institutions, particularly at the sub-district level; indeed, several sub-district councils and revenue 
offices in Yendi were not fully operational at the time of research as a result of resource 
constraints.8 These challenges are exacerbated by low wages for local revenue collectors, 
particularly relative to those of national collectors. These low wages were widely reported by 
both salaried collectors and collectors on commission as fuelling their lack of motivation, thus 
creating challenges for local governments to attract qualified individuals. Aside from low revenue 
potential from small traders, commission-based incomes are particularly vulnerable on account 
of seasonal fluctuations in market activity and irregular payment schedules.  
 
Administrative fragmentation and weak monitoring of tax collectors, particularly in sub-district 
areas, exacerbates the issue of limited capacity. Neither Yendi nor Lawra set revenue targets for 
sub-district areas, while several revenue collection offices were simply not monitored at all, 
reflecting high monitoring costs and low revenue potential. Accordingly, district officers reported 
that area councils often fail to remit revenue to the assembly for periods of four to six months at 
a time. A lack of monitoring has, in turn, enabled illegitimate tax collectors to extract revenue 
with virtual impunity from market traders in certain cases. This is most notably true of itinerant 
traders travelling to the rotating periodic or central district markets, who often face double 
taxation – once in their home area, and a second time in the host market. Ultimately, the Yendi 
External Auditor, of the Ghana Audit Service, succinctly captured the weak state of monitoring, 
lamenting ‘no one is taking responsibility for revenue raising in the districts’.9 
 
Finally, while fragmentation and weak monitoring open the door to informal practices, the 
potential for informality is amplified by unclear rules and unequal power dynamics. Most 
obviously, the complexity and opacity of local government taxation, and market taxation in 
particular, has consequences for equitable tax enforcement. Distinct market fees are charged for 
every conceivable commodity, generating a poor understanding of tax legislation among both 
                                                        
8  The number of assemblies has increased from 110 in 1988, to 138 in 2006, to 170 in 2008, to 216 in 2012. Each assembly 
has lower levels of government (local, area and/or urban councils), implying significant institutional, human resource and 
financial needs. Personal interview with Yendi Municipal Assembly (YMA) Accounts Officer, December 2011, Yendi, Ghana. 
9  The Ghana Audit Service is a constitutional body mandated to independently audit the public accounts of all assemblies 
(GoG 1992: Art. 188). Personal interview with the Yendi External Auditor, July 2012. 
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taxpayers and tax collectors, and ample space for arbitrariness and negotiation in the setting of 
rates. Meanwhile, weak local institutions and capacity provide significant scope for politically 
influential individuals to circumnavigate bureaucratic processes or pressure tax officials to lower 
or overlook their tax assessments, with negative implications for the uniform application of tax 
legislation and the horizontal equity of the tax regime.10   
 
3.2 Moral economy, power relations and the practice of local market taxation 
 
The formal institutional environment for tax collection is thus characterised by bureaucratic 
weakness and significant scope for discretion. The result, however, is not a simple proliferation 
of arbitrary enforcement and corruption. Instead, we find that outcomes ‘in the shadow’ of weak 
formal institutions are governed to a significant degree by socially embedded norms and informal 
practices that dictate relatively consistent divergence from formal policy. These informal 
practices may have positive implications for social welfare and horizontal equity, as they are 
driven by local economic realities and accepted notions of fairness. However, underlying power 
dynamics and social hierarchies equally shape informal norms in practice, limiting their 
equalising potential.  
 
At a basic level, the official tax system may be too inflexible to be well suited to local economic 
realities, and this is reflected in the informal realities of enforcement. Government 
representatives generally assume that taxes and fees on the poorest segments of the population 
are so low as to have a negligible impact on taxpayers. However, while local market taxes may 
be modest in absolute terms, they often represent a significant and steady burden on highly 
variable, seasonal and insecure incomes. As Bahiigwa et al. (2004: 9) note, ‘to say that the 
amounts involved are too small to really matter… is to distort the very meaning of poverty, which 
is that people’s consumption is already below the minimum acceptable level’. The majority of the 
100 traders interviewed for this study reported less than US$5.10 in daily gross turnover. This 
implies regularly receiving little or no daily profit after accounting for the costs of trading and 
borrowing, as well as, perhaps more importantly, a very high degree of vulnerability in the face of 
seasonal fluctuations and unexpected shocks (Scott 1976: 156). 
 
The rigid formal system is ill suited to deal with the variability and unpredictability inherent in 
precarious local economic realities. Front line officials correspondingly often adopt informal 
practices, driven by social norms of fairness, to soften the impact of blunt formal tax 
instruments.11 For instance, while local collectors are mandated to collect market fees daily, tax 
collectors in Lawra are reported to be ‘sympathetic’ to traders during the seasonal market 
downturn, collecting market fees less frequently during the rainy season.12 By understanding the 
reality that in a bad season a fixed tax applied with ‘blind rigor’ is in effect, ‘an expanding 
proportional claim on… diminishing resources’ (Scott 1976: 52 and 92), local tax collectors are 
able to make tax rates more sensitive to actual profits than is permitted by statutory rules. 
Moreover, in practice collectors apply relatively standardised informal exemptions for, most 
                                                        
10  Personal interview with Lawra District Coordinating Director, August 2012, Lawra, Ghana. Looking beyond market taxes, in 
our case districts this has resulted in the virtual non-collection of property tax, as well as certain inequities in the tax code 
itself: for instance, in Lawra, the bicycle and motorbike tax rates are more expensive than the rate for a private car (Lawra 
District Assembly (LDA) 2009). 
11  Kinyanjui (2013: 150) describes such processes as the ‘creation of an African indigenous social economic order’ based on 
indigenous business norms, the ‘wide use of social relations’, and the application of ‘African institutional values […] such as 
sharing, reciprocity, loyalty, and altruism’. 
12  Such unofficial practices of providing ‘subsistence security’ in the form of informal seasonal exemptions have been described 
as ‘nearly universal in traditional society’, though they have rarely been recorded (Scott 1976: 5-6, 54). This has generally 
been a pragmatic strategy on the part of authorities, as the inflexibility of the tax regime has recurrently been a source of tax 
resistance and, in extreme cases, class protest and rebellion (Scott 1976: 92). 
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notably, the elderly, disabled, recently widowed, and mothers of young twins.13 For example, 
taxpayers and tax collectors in Yendi market relayed the example of an elderly trader who is no 
longer asked to pay tax, as collectors ‘take pity on her’ because she is ‘tired’, with collectors 
simply moving along to ‘stronger women’. 
 
The majority of traders support these informal exemptions, which thus represent socially 
sanctioned ways through which frontline officials enhance the progressiveness and legitimacy of 
the local tax system. Further, tax collectors in both districts described hesitancy to enforce 
penalties, which are fixed regardless of the tax rate in question, and can be as high as 50 times 
the original rate (LDA 2009). Local tax collectors were reported to be understanding to traders 
making little profit, allowing traders to make up for missed payments at future collections, taking 
goods in lieu of payment or simply ignoring tax obligations. Other traders generally do not 
perceive these forms of evasion negatively. For example, traders explained that in certain 
instances it may even be fair for other traders to hide from collectors, as these women may 
simply be trying to ensure that they have enough money to pay for their trips home and to feed 
their families.  
 
Social norms of fairness also inform local understandings of acceptable forms of ‘corruption’. 
While tax compliance theory suggests that corrupt tax collectors or uneven tax enforcement may 
lower tax morale by reducing perceptions of fairness (Cummings et al. 2005; Torgler 2005; 
Fjeldstad 2004; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001), there was widespread acceptance by taxpayers 
of forms of petty corruption amongst tax collectors. Indeed, traders often explained that due to 
low commission rates, it is fair for collectors to keep a little extra for themselves or to ‘chop 
small’.14 As several female traders explained within the Lawra market, ‘everyone eats at work.’ 
This is not to say that all forms of ‘corruption’ were deemed acceptable: traders frequently 
condemned efforts to extract large sums from those who could not pay, or the tendency of some 
collectors to extract additional revenues from illiterate or foreign women, as discussed below.  
Instead, it is a further indication that practices in the market, and notions of what constitutes 
‘corruption’, are socially embedded within local logics and norms (Olivier de Sardan 1999), 
implying a subjective and context-specific understanding of legality and legitimacy. This 
fundamentally implies that policy approaches must ‘not begin with an abstract normative 
standard, but the values of the real actors’ (Scott 1976: 160). 
 
A general principle of reciprocity underlies these social norms (Scott 1976; Gouldner 1960; 
Olivier de Sardan 2008), reflecting what Roitman (2005: 89) describes as ‘the logics of social 
exchange – the tightly spun web of rights, obligations, and sensibilities that are dramatised in 
transfer’. From one side, the chief revenue collectors in both districts explained that they are 
hesitant to enforce the relatively severe penalties for tax evasion, as their capacity to encourage 
tax compliance is underpinned by social relationships with taxpayers, and would be undermined 
by violating social norms of fairness.15 From the other side of the relationship, taxpayers 
described sympathy with collectors and a desire to pay whenever they are able, in order to help 
collectors avoid trouble with their supervisors. For instance, a woman selling beans without a 
stall in the Yendi market explained that if she pays her market fee, it leaves both her and the 
collector free to do their jobs. The willingness of collectors ‘to go and come’ is particularly valued 
                                                        
13  These types of informal tax exemptions have been recorded in other recent cases: for instance, in the African Great Lakes 
region, informal customs tax exemptions may be informally made for essential foodstuffs, pregnant women, the disabled, 
and other social categories deemed worthy of assistance (Titeca and Kimanauka 2012; Tegara and Johnson 2007). 
14  ‘To chop’ in Ghanaian English refers to all illegal modes of enrichment through positions of authority, similar to Francophone 
Africa’s bouffer (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 28).  
15  Personal interviews with YMA Chief Superintendent of Revenue Collection, December 2011 and July 2012, Yendi, Ghana 
and LDA Chief Market Revenue Collector, December 2011, Lawra, Ghana. 
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by traders, given the unpredictability of their daily solvency, and was central to traders’ feelings 
of solidarity and reciprocity with tax collectors. Meanwhile, in Lawra, where taxpayers are 
relieved of daily tax obligations during seasonal downturns, taxpayers showed an appreciation 
for local tax collectors and a willingness to pay in order to make collectors’ jobs as easy as 
possible. Put most broadly, when taxpayers voluntarily comply with tax demands, there is tacit 
consensus that collectors will be more understanding to taxpayers when they are unable to pay.  
 
Alongside these norms of reciprocity, tax compliance is shaped to a significant extent by broader 
social relations and expectations in the market. Taxpayers described a willingness to comply 
with tax payments in order to avoid disrupting the social order, to ‘keep the peace’ within the 
market, to avoid public embarrassment, and to maintain good relations with tax collectors, whom 
traders in Lawra described as the community’s ‘brothers’ and ‘sons’.16 This is consistent with 
what Clark (2002, 2010b) describes as the ‘need to keep trade running smoothly’ – a collective 
desire within the market and one that ensures compliance with informal agreements and norms. 
However, it is important to note that social influences and economic motives are closely 
intertwined. While the social costs of challenging social expectations may be high for traders, 
traders in both Lawra and Yendi equally explained that being labelled disruptive and ‘anti-social’ 
by other traders also carries important economic costs.17 
 
A comparison of taxpayer perspectives about national and local tax collectors offers a further 
window into the particular role that norms of fairness, social obligation and reciprocity play in 
local government market taxation. Within our case districts, taxpayers made clear distinctions 
between tax collectors from their communities and national collectors. The latter are often from 
different regions and ethnic backgrounds and are more likely to be perceived as ‘strangers’, not 
fitting within local reciprocal networks and notions of exchange and solidarity.18 Traders perceive 
local tax collectors to be more responsive to local economic and social realities, whereas 
national tax collectors are seen to represent an inflexible application of tax legislation, providing 
less opportunity for informal tax settlements, little leniency with regard to non-payment and a 
stricter application of penalties (see also Atuguba 2006). For instance, reflecting a common 
experience amongst traders, a batik seller in Yendi described having no issues with local 
collectors, but described GRA collectors as being less understanding, unfriendly, ‘harsh’ and 
‘quarrelsome’, and more willing to lock her store or confiscate her goods than the local 
collectors. Unsurprisingly, taxpayers in both case districts reported less willingness to pay taxes 
to national collectors.  
 
A final component of these informal norms and practices is the enduring role of the chieftaincy in 
tax collection.19 Though indirect involvement by chiefs in tax collection is not mandated by 
                                                        
16  Seventy-four per cent of traders explained that they pay taxes because there is no alternative if they want to trade in the market 
and ‘keep the peace’. Indeed, traders in Lawra market described their willingness to pay tax in order to avoid the ‘penalty’ of 
having collectors ‘not being happy with them’ or having collectors embarrass them in front of their peers. In Yendi market, 
some traders highlighted that an informal penalty of not paying the market tax is related to being perceived by other traders as 
disruptive and ‘anti-social’. They accordingly explained that they pay tax in order to avoid public humiliation. This is 
corroborated by other research; for instance, Olken and Sighal’s 2011 cross-country study of community-based informal tax 
systems finds that compliance is enforced by systems of social sanctions, such as peer pressure, public shaming, or community 
ostracism. As explained by Olivier de Sardan (1999: 46): ‘“Shame” is, in the majority of African cultures, a powerful means of 
social control’.  
17  Cleaver et al. (2013) describe such economic costs in terms of ‘loss of reputation, goodwill and patronage, payment of fines, 
time spent resolving disputes, and restricted […] access’ to public goods. 
18  Indeed, the GRA has a policy of frequently transferring staff to different districts in order to avoid familiarity between tax 
collectors and taxpayers. Personal interview with senior district GRA official, December 2011, Yendi, Ghana.  
19  As a part of indirect rule, chiefs were charged and remunerated for collecting taxes and tributes on behalf of the colonial 
government (Jönsson 2009; Atuguba 2006; Agyemang 2011; Rathbone 1999), though a legitimate taxing authority, 
materialising in different manners, extends much further back for chiefly communities in the south and the centralised, chiefly 
communities of the northern regions (Atuguba 2006; Ladouceur 1979; Tait 1961). 
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legislation, and direct taxation on their part is constitutionally barred (GoG 1992: Art. 174.1), 
local governments’ capacities to extract revenues often remain dependent on the unofficial 
involvement of traditional authorities. At the same time, direct collection of informal ‘taxes’ by 
chiefs remains common, for instance, to provide for seasonal harvest festivals or community-
based projects (see also Agyemang 2011; Atuguba 2006; Jönsson 2009; Rathbone 1999). 
These taxes are based, in principle, on a reciprocal relationship with taxpayers: chiefs receive 
taxes in cash and kind, while taxpayers can then come to them to address disputes or to receive 
forms of social insurance in downtimes (Atuguba 2006). Meanwhile, chiefs’ influence over formal 
tax compliance is rooted in their ability to shape popular perceptions of the legitimacy of local 
taxes, and of local governments more generally.   
 
In both of our cases, support for formal local government tax collection, or lack thereof, can often 
be understood as part of a broader struggle for local-level influence. In Lawra, the chieftaincy 
has played an important role in public forums and in tax education and sensitisation campaigns, 
thus generally supporting tax collection.20 By contrast, efforts to undermine tax collection are 
reportedly much more prevalent in Yendi. Recent intra-chieftaincy conflicts have negatively 
affected the relationships between the local government and chiefs, with corresponding 
consequences for the willingness of the chiefs to support local government revenue-raising 
efforts. Indeed, during the localised conflict in Yendi in the early 2000s and for many subsequent 
years, the local government faced major challenges in collecting local revenues on account of 
disharmonious relations between the chiefs and the local government.21 In other instances, 
‘social insurance’ from chiefs has come in the form of shielding taxpayers from local or national 
government collectors. The prominent role of chiefs, despite the absence of any legal standing 
in this domain, serves as a further illustration of the importance of informal norms in shaping tax 
practices, and of the ways in which informal norms can serve to increase equity by ‘shielding’ 
taxpayers from what are perceived to be unfair, or unrequited, extractions. 
 
However, while the informal norms and practices discussed so far may reflect a local moral and 
social economic order, the story is not uniquely positive. Just as informal norms and practices 
can improve outcomes and yield greater cooperation, such informal norms and practices can 
equally legitimise and reinforce existing inequities, as these informal practices are rooted in 
power dynamics and social hierarchies (Roitman 2005; Cleaver et al. 2013; Titeca and de Herdt 
2010; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012). In our case districts, the most vulnerable groups in the 
market – including illiterate, itinerant, and foreign traders – were widely felt to receive less 
favourable treatment by tax collectors. For instance, traders accused local tax collectors, 
particularly at the sub-district level, of taking advantage of illiterate and non-Ghanaian traders by 
charging them twice using the same tax receipt, charging higher rates than listed on the receipt 
or giving them counterfeit tax receipts.22 In other instances, application of social norms is 
uneven, based on the power and discretion of the tax collector. For instance, while habitual 
exemptions were made in Lawra for a pito brewer whose business was slow, kayakaya (market 
porters) and women selling small amounts of vegetables did not receive the same benefits, even 
                                                        
20  Personal interviews with LDA Finance and Budget Officers, December 2011 and August 2011, Lawra, Ghana; Christian Aid 
Ghana Country Manager and Programme Officer, November and December 2011, Accra, Ghana; and Ghana Integrity 
Initiative Programme Manager, November 2011, Accra, Ghana.   
21  Personal interviews with YMA Municipal Finance Officer and Deputy Municipal Finance Officer, July 2012, Yendi, Ghana. 
This has historical precedence more broadly: indeed, when Nkrumah’s post-independence government reduced the political 
autonomy and authority of traditional authorities beginning in the late 1950s, chiefs opted not to cooperate with local 
councils, resulting in significantly decreased tax revenues (Agyemang 2011). 
22  At the same time, itinerant and foreign traders in Lawra may pay the market fee at a greater frequency than daily resident 
traders as they are made to pay the tax every time they visit. While not all itinerant traders attend sub-district area council 
markets daily, those that do may end up paying more frequently than local traders.  
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though their profits were felt to be comparable. Instead, these traders often had to borrow 
money from peers in order to pay the market fee.  
 
In other cases, certain individuals enjoy informal privileges in the market, putting others at 
competitive disadvantages. Perhaps the most extreme example comes from the fact that larger 
traders renting formal market stalls are often not required to pay daily market fees in practice, 
making their cumulative monthly tax payments less than those of smaller traders who are 
required to pay a daily market fee. In other cases, politically connected traders, relations of the 
local chiefs and relations of tax collectors are often informally exempted from market fees, while 
relations of the chief and the traditional landowning class enjoy other market privileges, including 
the right to take goods from traders at no cost. One might expect there to be a less positive view 
of unofficial exemptions from local taxes for the extended family of the traditional landowning 
class, however the majority of traders simply accepted this practice as a fact of their social 
system.  
 
The aggregate impact of these various informal practices is difficult to gauge precisely.  
Nevertheless, survey evidence from Carroll (2011) indicates that the overall effect may be 
regressive, even when compared to an already regressive formal system. This is consistent with 
our findings: those in privileged positions appear to benefit most from special treatment, while 
informality often increases the vulnerability of those with the very lowest incomes (itinerant 
traders, illiterate traders). On the other hand, for the bulk of market traders there are also 
substantial benefits arising from greater flexibility, attention to the effects of seasonality and 
special treatment for the elderly, disabled and widowed. That is, the reality is consistent neither 
with a romanticised view of a purely moral informal economy, nor with a legalistic approach that 
labels all form of informality corruption. In any case, the question of ultimate interest is not 
whether informality is, on balance, ‘good’ or ‘bad’. As the discussion so far makes clear, 
informality is in many ways an inescapable feature of local government taxation of market 
traders and small businesses. The more relevant question, to which we return later, is how to 
align reform strategies with the reality of these systems as they function in practice. 
 
3.3 Market traders, market associations and the state 
 
While an understanding of the day-to-day realities of market taxation offers insight into the 
incidence of taxation and the broader forces shaping tax collection, it also offers a lens through 
which to consider broader questions about the relationship between small taxpayers and the 
state. A growing literature has argued that a critical motivation for more effective market taxation 
lies not in the (very modest) revenue collected, but in the potential for tax collection to act as a 
catalyst for more active engagement between market traders and the state, thus potentially 
spurring the expansion of accountability (Joshi et al. forthcoming). However, there is mounting 
recognition that such ‘tax bargaining’ is far from guaranteed: despite some localised evidence of 
mobilisation by small business associations, there are stark barriers to effective collective action 
by the marginalised groups, as these groups frequently confront unresponsive governments and 
weak and internally undemocratic market associations (Joshi and Ayee 2008; Prichard 2010; 
Meagher and Lindell 2013). There is a corresponding need to better understand the barriers to 
effective collective action by market associations, and potential areas of opportunity.  
 
The challenges to collective action are readily apparent in our case districts, where traders tend 
to be poorly organised and to demonstrate little understanding of the local tax system. Within our 
case districts, less than a fifth of all respondents (17 per cent) reported knowing how their 
assembly spends tax revenues, while what was ‘known’ was often inaccurate. For instance, the 
vast majority described local tax revenues being used for community development projects, such 
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as schools and roads, which are in fact funded by central government transfers or external 
grants; whereas almost all locally generated revenues fund the administrative costs of the 
assemblies. The majority of traders in both case districts reported never having engaged with tax 
collectors or assembly representatives to discuss issues of taxation, never having attended a 
civic education programme on taxation, and feeling like they do not have the right to ask 
questions of collectors or assembly representatives. A majority (60 per cent) of respondents did 
not feel well informed about why they pay taxes, though this number was 80 per cent in Yendi, 
and only 36 per cent in Lawra. Better information in Lawra is consistent with the potential for 
markets to be sites for spreading information and engagement, as Lawra is home to a larger 
range of market associations and closer ties between tax collectors and taxpayers.   
 
While the potential for market associations to act as conduits for information is thus apparent, so 
too are the limits of the reach of these associations. None of the traders interviewed in Yendi 
were members of any association or cooperative. While 34 per cent of respondents in Lawra 
reported involvement in associations, the majority were described as susu (Akan for ‘small 
small’) organisations or rotating savings and credit associations, rather than vehicles for political 
mobilisation or engagement.23 While membership of ‘formal’ associations is limited, markets 
throughout Ghana are also informally organised into a system of commodity-based groups 
(Clark 1991, 2002, 2004, 2010a and 2010b). These groups may have a formal structure with 
officially recognised members, but may also be more informally defined (Clark 1991, 2004). 
These informal organisations are designed to offer mutual support for traders, including support 
in negotiating with government officials and chiefs, while they equally serve to reinforce informal 
rules and sanctions within the market (Clark 2010a, 2010b).  
 
However, despite the well-established role of these informal organisations in Ghanaian markets, 
traders in both districts reported a lack of accountability on the part of association leaders. While 
research by Clark (1991, 2010a, 2010b) has pointed to the existence of informally 
institutionalised forms of internal and external accountability within commodity groups elsewhere 
in Ghana, our evidence reinforces the message that effective accountability is not universal or 
guaranteed – even in Lawra, which has been identified by other researchers as an example of 
relatively inclusive market governance around taxation (Carroll 2011, author interviews).24 
Consistent with research elsewhere, we find that market associations often lack inclusivity and 
internal accountability, while sometimes exacerbating social divisions and economic exclusion 
owing to inequitable patterns of inclusion (Joshi et al. forthcoming; Meager 2010 and 2013; 
Booth 2011a). Traders described associations as being dominated by politics amongst traders 
and leaders, with some associations being dissolved for internal ‘political’ reasons.  
 
We similarly do not find evidence in our case districts of associations or commodity groups 
serving as effective links to the local government (see also Owusu and Lund 2004). Indeed, 
traders reported that the association leaders, or ‘market heads’, had no clear channels of access 
to the assembly, while traders did not perceive them as direct routes to information or 
accountability. This is more apparent in Yendi, where the Yendi Cooperative Food and Farming 
Market Society, the primary market association, has a limited number of members, with unclear 
information diffusion strategies within the market and unclear representation, despite having an 
                                                        
23  A distinction should be drawn between Western and indigenous ideas of ‘organisation’. Clark (2010b: 250) emphasises that 
‘Western models of cooperatives, with committees and secretaries, supplement but do not supplant’ existing forms of 
organisation, such as those based on chieftaincy models. Indeed, she notes that traders may adopt the trappings of Western 
models of market organisations in order to access new forms of legitimacy, effectively ‘incorporating Western terms and 
institutions into indigenous patterns… without disrupting them substantially’ (Clark 2010b: 258-9). 
24  Personal interviews with senior staff members from Christian Aid Ghana and the Ghana Integrity Initiative, November 2011, 
Accra, Ghana. 
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assembly member on its committee.25 These connections are somewhat stronger in Lawra, 
which is home to a larger number of formal associations as well as direct communication 
channels to the district assembly through the Lawra District Union, which represents 16 
cooperatives and 300 members across the district. However, even the union’s executive 
secretary explained that these communication channels offer limited substantive engagement 
with the assembly and are largely ineffective in practice, while taxpayers complain that they 
often do not receive even basic tax information through the associations.26   
 
The weakness of links between taxpayers, market associations and the government is most 
clearly illustrated by the process for approving the annual fee fixing resolution, which sets local 
tax rates. In both districts, assembly finance officials described the process as being fair and 
inclusive, with representatives of market associations both contributing to policy formulation and 
communicating the fee fixing resolution to their members. However, the Yendi External Auditor, 
of the Ghana Audit Service, explained unequivocally that the resolution is, in fact, set without 
consultation with the market traders or their associational representatives, while the same 
situation was reported in Lawra.27 Meanwhile, traders and tax collectors provide regular reports 
of market heads failing to communicate the fee fixing resolution to group members, with tax 
collectors explaining that this makes their job more difficult by increasing the hostility of traders 
towards them.   
 
While the overall picture is thus discouraging, there are nevertheless scattered examples of 
more effective relations between associations and the local government. This includes a small 
number of associations in both districts that have both negotiated tax rates with the assembly or 
chief, and collected revenue on behalf of these authorities. For example, the seamstress 
association in Lawra collects payments on behalf of the local government from its members, and 
has negotiated down the rate its members pay to the district assembly for business licenses.28 In 
Yendi, the aforementioned market cooperative assists revenue officers in collecting the tax on 
export foodstuffs, earning a commission for doing so. Meanwhile, more informally, a pito 
brewers’ association in Lawra successfully negotiated with the local chiefs in order to absolve its 
members of the obligation to contribute informal taxes for the annual Kobine, or harvest, festival 
when business was slow. 
 
However, even where such bargains have been struck they are best understood as pragmatic 
ventures, rather than avenues for expanded taxpayer engagement with the local government, as 
there is no evidence that these forms of ‘associational taxation’ have led to greater political 
mobilisation or accountability in other issue areas. Tellingly, the executive secretary of the Lawra 
Cooperatives Union was not aware of any revenue mobilisation partnerships with associations in 
the district, despite their existence in practice. For their part, association members do not 
generally view engagement with the local government as a critical role for associations, which 
are first and foremost expected to keep trade flowing in the market and to support members in 
ceremonial and social activities (see also Owusu and Lund 2004; Clark 2010a and 2010b). 
 
 
 
                                                        
25  Personal interviews with Yendi Cooperative Food Farming and Market Society Representative, July 2012, Yendi, Ghana and 
YMA Councillor (Assembly Member), July 2012, Yendi, Ghana. 
26  Personal interview with District Cooperatives Union Secretary, August 2012, Lawra, Ghana.  
27  Personal interviews with the Yendi External Auditor, July 2012, Yendi, Ghana and District Cooperatives Union Secretary, 
August 2012.  
28  Members of this association pay GHS4 (Ghanaian New Cedi) quarterly, while seamstresses that are not members of the 
association must pay GHS6 quarterly. 
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4 Formal rules, informal realities and policy 
implications 
 
Confronted with the reality of a local government system of market and small business taxation 
characterised by weak collection, negotiation of rates, widespread leakages, and ineffective 
monitoring, calls for reform have become increasingly emphatic. Seen through a technocratic 
lens, appropriate prescriptions are relatively straightforward, and to some extent already 
reflected in developments throughout Ghana. These include the creation of new monitoring 
frameworks and requirements, extending the reach and authority of the national revenue 
agency, rotation of national staff to avoid collusion between taxpayers and officials, aggressive 
penalties for noncompliance and an overall drive towards legal rationality. 
 
However, the realities of local government taxation suggest that, taken in isolation, these 
approaches may frequently have limited success, and may potentially be counterproductive.  
Improved monitoring is certainly welcome, but the starkly limited revenues available from small 
traders, and the distances involved in monitoring sub-district areas, virtually ensure that frontline 
interactions and informal norms will remain pivotal to actual outcomes. There is similarly little 
evidence to suggest that harsh penalties, the rotation of staff and the extension of the power of 
the GRA have led to improved collection, but it is clear that they have in many cases served to 
breed mistrust between taxpayers and the government. Meanwhile, standard reform proposals 
frequently fail to acknowledge the legitimate equity benefits that may arise from existing informal 
norms or to recognise the ways in which unequal local power dynamics can distort the intended 
goals of reform. The implication is not to abandon the drive towards improved monitoring and 
rules-based taxation, but to identify reform strategies that acknowledge inescapable local 
constraints, that work ‘with the grain’ of existing practices and that seek to embrace the benefits 
that can arise from informality, while curbing the worst excesses of these systems. While this 
remains an area for further research, evidence from northern Ghana points toward a set of 
preliminary messages. 
 
4.1 Engage and strengthen local market associations 
 
In seeking to strengthen local government tax collection from market sellers and small 
businesses, three basic facts loom large. First, limited resources mean that the ability of 
governments to monitor frontline collection is likely to remain limited, with collection 
correspondingly heavily shaped by informal norms. Second, taxpayers frequently express a 
willingness to pay more taxes in return for greater transparency and greater reciprocity from 
government. Third, local governments claim to work with local market associations in order to 
develop policy, monitor collection and transmit information to taxpayers, but evidence from our 
research makes clear that either these claims are disingenuous or these efforts are undermined 
by weak ties between the formal representatives of market associations and the bulk of traders.  
  
Against this background there appears to be a powerful impetus for reformist governments to 
proactively engage and strengthen local market associations. Most basically, closer engagement 
with empowered market associations offers an informal mechanism for monitoring tax collection. 
At one extreme, research has documented the potential for partnering directly with informal 
associations in collecting revenue from their members (Joshi and Ayee 2008; Joshi et al. 
forthcoming). However, even less formalised arrangements offer the potential for associations to 
play an important role in ensuring rules-based collection, while retaining some scope for frontline 
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negotiation and flexibility. At least as important, strengthening market associations has the 
potential to facilitate collective action and bargaining by otherwise vulnerable and isolated 
traders, which may allow for greater reciprocity and trust between taxpayers and governments.29  
 
Consistent with this view, many traders in our case districts emphasised that they would be 
willing to pay more taxes if collection was more accountable and taxes resulted in tangible 
improvements in market services and infrastructure. The long history of formal and informal 
market associations, and of commodity market groups, lends credence to the idea that they 
have the potential to be effective channels through which taxpayers connect to their local 
governments. However, a more effective role for market associations will depend on proactive 
efforts to create space for engagement with local governments, and to press for greater 
inclusiveness within these associations. As it stands, in Lawra and Yendi, associations often 
appear to replicate existing inequalities while failing to play the constructive role that is 
sometimes ascribed to them in existing debates. 
 
4.2 Engage traditional authorities 
 
An equally pivotal feature of the account here is the extent to which effective tax collection 
depends on informal relationships, the support of powerful local brokers and quasi-voluntary tax 
compliance among rank and file traders. Research elsewhere has increasingly highlighted that 
in the absence of some degree of legitimacy, improved local government tax collection is likely 
to remain difficult to achieve (Jibao and Prichard 2014; Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen 2013). Pivotal 
to this relationship in Ghana is the role of the chieftaincy, which has historically been central to 
tax collection and informally continues to wield significant influence over tax compliance, while 
also collecting a range of ‘informal taxes’ (Jönsson 2009; Atuguba 2006; Rathbone 1999; 
Agyemang 2011). Particularly within sub-district area councils, revenue collectors are largely 
unable to mobilise revenue from taxpayers without the tacit support of the local chief.30  
 
While this authority can be used to support the local government, it can also be used to 
undermine local government tax collection and legitimacy. Moreover, there are clear risks that 
the chieftaincy may be unaccountable and may reinforce existing hierarchies and regressive 
patterns of tax collection. There appears to be a correspondingly strong argument to be made 
for local governments to engage proactively with the chieftaincy in seeking to gain support for 
local tax collection, while also advocating for equitable enforcement practices.31  
      
4.3 Empower local government authorities 
 
Acknowledging the social foundations of local government taxation also argues for empowering 
local tax authorities, rather than turning to central government tax collectors to strengthen 
enforcement. The GRA has focused on employing ‘outsiders’ as local tax collectors as a strategy 
to reduce the scope for collusion between taxpayers and tax collectors. This is an intuitive 
                                                        
29  Successes of informal trading and occupational associations in achieving greater inclusion within local and even national 
policy spaces has been reported elsewhere (e.g. Meagher and Lindell 2013; Lindell 2010; Devenish and Skinner 2004; 
Andrae and Beckman 2013; Kinyanjui 2013; Prag 2013; Meagher 2013). Nevertheless, research also emphasises that 
marginalised groups may have a limited ability to form effective linkages with the state even when they form highly organised 
associations (Cleaver et al. 2013; Meager 2013).  
30  Recent evidence from Sierra Leone likewise highlights the ability of chiefs to essentially block implementation of the property 
tax, but also provides evidence of how important perceptions of the chief are to tax compliance (Jibao and Prichard 2013, 
2014).  
31  Tentative but somewhat ad hoc efforts in this direction have occurred in Ghana, some of them supported by the German 
development agency, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Similar efforts to engage chiefs as 
allies in tax reform initiatives have been documented in Sierra Leone (Jibao and Prichard 2013). 
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strategy, and does appear to yield somewhat stricter enforcement. However, the investigation 
here, and anecdotal evidence elsewhere, suggests that gains in revenue are likely to be modest, 
in large part because of the emergence of a more adversarial relationship between external tax 
collectors and taxpayers. 
 
While the benefits of relying on the national tax authority to collect taxes from small businesses 
thus appears overstated, experience in Lawra and Yendi speaks clearly to the potential costs of 
such an approach. Interviews with small taxpayers make clear that they have dramatically better 
relationships with local tax collectors. This relationship does not appear to reflect the simple 
absence of enforcement, but the greater flexibility of local tax collectors in responding to the 
often very real livelihood constraints faced by precarious small traders. There seems a broader 
likelihood – though one that warrants further research – that this more trusting relationship with 
tax collectors may have broader implications for perceptions of the legitimacy of the state. The 
implication is that the technocratic instinct toward strengthening collection through coercion by 
more autonomous tax collectors may frequently be self-defeating, with any short-term revenue 
gains more than offset by often overlooked impacts on trust in the state and on the extent and 
flexibility of the actual tax burden borne by the poor. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The weakness of local government tax collection in low-income countries is by now well 
documented, as are a relatively standard set of policy and administrative reforms designed to 
yield improved outcomes. However, to date, progress in achieving improved outcomes has been 
slow. These poor outcomes can be traced to a wide variety of sources, including uncommitted 
local reform leadership, limited resources and a lack of support from central governments. To 
this story we have sought to add another, more subtle challenge: the need to pay closer 
attention to the social foundations of tax collection in resource constrained and comparatively 
marginalised local government areas. We have argued that an acknowledgement of the 
inescapable resource and capacity constraints facing many local governments, and of the 
correspondingly critical role of informal practices in shaping outcomes, points towards the need 
for more contextually appropriate approaches to reform. 
 
Underlying our policy suggestions is a call for greater openness to the potential value of 
‘hybridity’ in the governance of local taxation, particularly among marginalised groups. Such an 
approach seeks to maximise the benefits that can emerge from reliance on flexible local systems 
– what Meagher and Lindell (2013) call an ‘ethos of “normalisation”’ – while minimising the risks 
that powerful interests will capture such informality and reinforce existing inequalities. The latter 
point is critical, as informal norms can generate improved governance outcomes, but are only 
likely to do so consistently, and for the most marginalised, if supported by proactive efforts to 
reinforce the ability of marginalised groups to participate in shaping these informal practices 
(Cleaver et al. 2013). Such efforts stand not only to improve the equity of tax outcomes, but also, 
potentially, to strengthen the ability of marginalised taxpayers to engage in broader bargaining 
with local governments. 
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Appendix 
 
Interviews 
 
Date Location Organisation, Unit Interviewee position 
December 2011 and 
July 2012 
Yendi Yendi Municipal 
Assembly (YMA) 
Accounts Officer 
July 2012 Yendi YMA Cashier 
July 2012 Yendi YMA Deputy Municipal 
Finance Officer 
July 2012 Yendi YMA Municipal Finance 
Officer 
December 2011 and 
July 2012 
Yendi YMA Market 
Revenue Office 
Chief Superintendent, 
Revenue Collection: 
Market taxation, 
market stall rents, 
property rate, 
business licenses 
July 2012 Yendi YMA Market 
Revenue Officer 
Chief Superintendent, 
Revenue Collection: 
Export foodstuffs 
December 2011 and 
July 2012 
Yendi Ghana Revenue 
Authority (GRA), 
Domestic Tax Unit 
District Tax Inspector 
Manager 
December 2011 and 
July 2012 
Yendi GRA, Domestic Tax 
Unit 
District Revenue 
Collector 
December 2011 and 
July 2012 
Yendi GRA, Domestic Tax 
Unit 
District Revenue 
Collector 
December 2011  Yendi GRA, Domestic Tax 
Unit 
District Chief 
Revenue Collector 
December 2011 Yendi GRA, Domestic Tax 
Unit 
District Revenue 
Collector 
July 2012 Yendi YMA Assembly Member 
(Councillor) 
July 2012 Yendi Yendi Cooperative 
Food Farming and 
Market Society 
Representative 
July 2012 Yendi External Audit 
Service of Ghana 
District Auditor 
July 2012 Yendi Lands Commission 
Office 
Land Valuation 
Division Director 
August 2012 Lawra Lawra District 
Assembly (LDA) 
District Coordinating 
Director 
December 2011 and 
August 2012 
Lawra LDA Internal Auditor 
December 2011 and 
August 2012 
Lawra LDA District Finance 
Officer 
December 2011 and 
August 2012 
Lawra LDA District Budget 
Officer 
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December 2011 and 
August 2012 
Lawra LDA Chief Cashier 
August 2012 Lawra LDA 
 
Assembly member, 
Sub-Committee for 
Finance and 
Administration 
member 
December 2011 Lawra National Commission 
for Civic Education 
District Field Officer 
August 2012 Lawra District Cooperatives 
Union 
Secretary 
August 2012 Lawra Lands Commission 
Office, Town and 
Country Planning, 
Survey and Mapping 
Division 
District Officer 
August 2012 Lawra National Youth 
Assembly 
District Vice-
President 
December 2011 Lawra GRA Domestic Tax 
Revenue Unit 
Regional Statistician, 
Upper West 
August 2012 Lawra Lawra Town Council Secretary  
August 2012 Lawra Lawra sub-district 
council 
Revenue Collection 
Supervisor 
December 2011 Lawra Lawra Town Council Chief Market 
Revenue Collector 
August 2012 Lawra Lawra District 
Cooperatives Union 
Secretary 
July 2012 Accra Local Government 
Service Secretariat 
(LGSS), Local 
Service Delivery and 
Governance 
Programme  
Director, Quality 
Assurance and 
Technical and 
National Coordinator, 
National Programme 
Secretariat 
July 2012 Accra LGSS, Local Service 
Delivery and 
Governance 
Programme 
Technical Advisor 
July 2012 Accra LGSS Director, Financial 
Management 
July 2012 Accra LGSS Director, Policy, 
Planning, Budgeting, 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
July 2012 Accra LGSS Development Planner 
July 2012 Accra Ministry of Local 
Government and 
Rural Development 
(MLGRD) 
Planning and Budget 
Officer 
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July 2012 Accra Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
Planning 
Director, Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
July 2012 Accra Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ), Good Financial 
Governance 
Programme 
Senior Tax Advisor 
November 2011 Accra GIZ within Ministry of  
Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Senior Tax Advisor 
July 2012 Accra GIZ, Support for 
Decentralisation 
Reform Programme 
Senior Advisor 
July 2012 Accra GIZ, Support for 
Decentralisation 
Reform Programme 
Programme Officer 
July 2012 Accra USAID, Local 
Governance and 
Decentralisation 
Programme 
Consultant 
November and 
December 2011, July 
2012 
Accra Christian Aid Ghana Country Manager 
November and 
December 2011, July 
2012 
Accra Christian Aid Ghana Programme Officer 
November 2011 Accra Ghana Integrity 
Initiative 
Programme Manager 
July 2012 Accra Institute of Local 
Government Studies 
Dean, Research and 
Studies 
November 2011 Accra Ghana Association of 
Women 
Entrepreneurs 
(GAWE) 
President 
December 2011 Wa, Upper West GAWE Member, small 
business owner 
December 2011 Wa, Upper West GAWE Member, small 
business owner 
December 2011 Wa, Upper West GAWE Member, small 
business owner 
December 2011 Wa, Upper West SEND Ghana (NGO) Programme Officer 
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